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Abstract
The practice of affirmative action has recently been at the vanguard of intense debate
more than any other time in its forty-year history. A growing number of programs
including quotas, preferential hiring, minority scholarships, diversity, and reverse
discrimination have all been linked to affirmative action, which aims to break down the
wall of segregation that excluded racial minorities and women from the workplace and in
education.
Two class-action lawsuits, Gratz v. Bollinger [02-516] and Gnttter v. Bollinger
[02-241], filed in response to white students being denied admission to the University of
Michigan's undergraduate and law school program, provided the United States Supreme
Court with its best opportunity in recent years to focus on the constitutionality of
adopting such admissions policies. Affirmative action policies are inconsistent with the
principle of merit (the idea of attaining what you earn) and they penalize an innocent
person for the alleged crimes of his or her ancestors, effectively known as reverse
discrimination. Furthermore, affirmative action unfairly rewards minorities on the
elToneous notion that a minority status automatically equates "disadvantage." In
conclusion, an additional perspective for the case against implementing affirmative action
policy within the workplace and in higher education will be presented.
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Affirmative Action: Equality or Reverse Discrimination?
Affirmative action is a program that serves to rectify the effects of purportedly
past societal discrimination by allocating jobs and opportunities to minorities and women.
Affirmative action programs were an outgrowth of the 1950s and 1960s civil rights
movements and the Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity legislation of the 1960s. Close to
fifty years later, the practice of affirmative action has been at the vanguard of intense
debate more than any other time in its history. Hardly a week goes by that the subject of
affirmative action does not come up in some context (e.g., in both the private and public
employment sectors as well as in the educational sphere). A growing number of
programs including quotas, preferential hiring, minority scholarship, and reverse
discrimination have all been categorized under this controversial policy; and all
ostensibly seek to break down the wall of segregation that excluded racial minorities and
women from occupational and educational placement throughout much of American
history.
The analysis of affirmati ve action in this thesis will first consider the changing
face of affirmative action from all perspectives: race and gender-based as it has been
applied in private employment, public employment, and higher education. Following a
glimpse into the definition of affirmative action, the analysis presents a history and
general overview of affirmative action, including a discussion of the various f01111s of
affirmative action (e.g., quotas, goals, and preferences); the comis' interpretation of
affirmative action; the arguments for and against affirmative action; and recent
developments pertaining to affirmative action. A separate section will include a close
analysis on the issue of affirmative action in higher education. A concluding section will
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consider the future of affirmative action and what, if any, other measures could be
utilized in achieving the goals of affirmative action.
The Hist0l1cai Context of Affirmative Action
The term "affirmative action" was first used in its cutTent civil rights context in
President Kennedy's 1961 Executive Order (EO) 10925, which created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC established guidelines for
contractors working on federally financed projects to employ affirmative action in order
to end discrimination in the workplace (Machan, 1988). John Skrentny, author of The
Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture and Justice in Am.erica, contends that the

basic concept underlying affirmative action comes from the English legal concept of
equity or "the administration of justice according to what was fair in a particular
situation, as opposed to rigidly following legal rules, which may have a harsh result"
(1996, p. 6). The first iteration of the term "affirmative action" in United States law or
policy appeared in the 1935 National Labor Relations Act where it "meant that an
employer who was found to be discriminating against union members or union organizers
would have to stop discrimination, and also take affirmative action to place those victims
where they would have been without the discrimination" (Skrentny, 1996, p. 6).
The onset of World War II renewed racial, ethnic, and gender tensions (Lynch,
1997). In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into legislation EO 8802, which
outlawed discriminatory hiring policies by defense-related industries that held federally
funded contracts. In its CUlTent usage, affirmative action was born out of the struggle for
civil rights. In his essay, "The Evolution of Affirmative Action," R.A. Lee (1999) asserts
that affirmative action is generally conceptualized as being one step beyond the concepts
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of non-discrimination and equal 0ppOltunity, moving towards a more pro-active stance of
"anti-discrimination" (p. 393). Citing economist Barbara Bergmann in his book, We

Want Jobs: A History ofAffinnative Action, Robert Weiss (1997) asselts that affirmative
action has three main objecti ves: "1) to overcome discrimination; 2) to increase diversity
within the labor force; and 3) to reduce povelty among groups historically victimized by
discrimination" (p. x). Lee (1999) presents the following definition of what has become
an increasingly confusing term:
It is the 'proactive policy of making special efforts in employment decisions,

college entrance, and other areas of public behavior as a way of compensating for
past discrimination. It is based on the thought that certain groups of people, even
in the absence of current discrimination against any individual member of that
group, are at a disadvantage in the workplace and on campuses because of the
effects. of past discrimination against some members of the group. Affirmative
action is an attempt to 'level the playing field' for whole categories of citizens,
and the emphasis is on 'disadvantaged groups' rather than injured individuals. (p.
394)
Although affirmative action as it developed in the 1960s and 1970s eventually came to
include anti-discrimination measures intended at a broad spectrum of "protected"
minorities (including women), the history and the bilth of affirmative action policy is
firmly rooted in black-white race relations and the struggle for black civil rights. In his
essay, "A Brief History of the Commitment to Inclusion as a Facet of Equal Educational
Opportunity," Robert D. Bickel (1998) traces the roots of affirmative action debate in
education to the late nineteenth century and the rise of black colleges, and
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correspondingly, the writings and speeches of educated African-Americans (e.g., W.E.B.
DuBois and Booker T. Washington) (p. 3). Bickel (1998) cites in pmiicular DuBois'
rejection of Washington's proposal for the "industrial education of the Negro" on the
grounds that such a program would constitute the creation of civil inferiority (p. 3).
Bickel (1998) remarks, "by 1942 blacks constituted substantially less than 1 percent of
graduates receiving Ph.D. degrees, and most of these recipients were trained in black
undergraduate colleges" (p. 4). The impetus towards affirmation action in education
suffered through most of the first half of the twentieth century, even as white universities
gradually felt compelled to admit larger numbers of black students.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, several southern states passed "Jim
Crow" laws, which were laws that injected racial segregation into virtually every area of
public life. In the 1896 case, Pless)! v. Ferguson [163 u.s. 537], the United States
Supreme Court (Supreme Court) upheld the constitutionality of such laws on the basis of
the "Separate but Equal" doctrine. The Pless)! decision estaBlished the precedent that
"separate" facilities for blacks and whites were constitutional providing they were
"equal." Dissenting from the majority'S opinion, Justice John M. Harlan (the elder)
fervently opposed the Supreme Couii's ruling and instead emphasized that "our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens"
(Stephens and Scheb, 2003, p. 726). The 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brmvn v.
Board of Education o.fTopeka [347 U.S. 483] ultimately repudiated the "Separate but

Equal" doctrine, regarding the premise that separate schools were unequal and thus, an
unconstitutional practice.
Weiss (1997) maintains, in his research into the history of affirmative action, that
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government measures directed at ensuring civil rights and nondiscrimination towards
blacks in the workplace during the first three decades of the twentieth century were
"largely symbolic" and mainly motivated by demographic pressures created by the large
migrations of blacks-a factor which put pressure for greater opportunity, if not equality,
on both industry and education (pp. 31-33). Historians generally consider that the first
federally mandated affirmative action program was developed in response to the creation
of the Public Works Administration (PWA) in 1933. The PWA Housing Division, which
was designed to create low-income housing for urban blacks, also saw an opportunity to
take advantage of the huge supply of unemployed black construction labor. In response
to pressure from civil rights proponents in the Roosevelt Administration, the PWA
Housing Division promulgated the first race-preferential hiring quota. The quotas were
based on the percentage of blacks in the local labor force, as determined by examination
of the 1930 United States Department of Commerce Census. Consequently, employers
who failed to hire the required percentage of black workers would be considered guilty of
practicing discrimination. Weiss (1997) mentions that the "first PWA project, in Atlanta,
included a clause affirming that 'the failure of the Contractor to pay Negro skilled labor
(irrespective of individual trades) shall be considered prima facie evidence of
discrimination by the Contractor'" (p. 35).
The outbreak of World War II and the conclusion of the New Deal program
encouraged blacks to focus on the booming defense industry as a key job target.
Nonetheless, neither the industry nor the unions that controlled its workers (notably the
AFL-CIO) felt any compulsion to provide equal or even unequal opportunity jobs for
blacks. The frustration over the employment situation served as a leading catalyst for the
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Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons
(NAACP), which began to coordinate major civil rights protests. Faced with the ensuing
prospect of a 100,000-strong "March on Washington" by blacks demanding job rights,
President Roosevelt issued EO 8802, establishing the Fair Employment Practices
Committee (FEPC) (Skrentny, 1996, p. 29). EO 8802, issued just one week before the
scheduled July 1, 1941 "March on Washington" rally, obliged the FEPC to enforce new
federal rules that all training and vocational programs for jobs in defense industries be
"administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin"
(Weiss, 1997, p. 37).
The two-track (education and employment) movement for black civil rights
converged in the early 1950s over the issue of school segregation. A formative moment
for the civil rights movement was the Brown v. Board of Education decision wherein the
Supreme COUlt reasoned "the segregation of public schools as a form of racial isolation
had a damaging effect on black children" (Bickel, 1998, p. 4), The Brown decision
permeated the civil rights movement with a sense of legitimacy and gave the civil rights
organizations a renewed sense of optimism.
The civil rights and black protest movement steadily grew throughout the rest of
the 1950s. By 1960, a new radicalism had emerged, as symbolized with the formation of
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (or SNCC, pronounced "snick") (Weiss,
1997, p. 51). SNCC was a nonviolent civil rights movement mainly devoted to
supporting their leaders and publicizing their activities in attempting to combat white
oppression. Moreover the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) also began to strengthen
its position during this period. Weiss (1997) contends:
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The 1960s witnessed a transformation of the goals as well as the strategies of the
civil rights movement. Just as mass protest became as critical to the movement as
legal actions, demands for specific remedial procedures-often involving the use of
numbers-supplanted acceptance of vaguely defined ledges of nondiscrimination
within the movement. (p. 51)
President Kennedy proved to be a bitter disappointment to most black leaders during his
first year in office, as civil rights leaders had been led to expect that Kennedy would push
for a new Civil Rights Act. Kennedy, however, soon made it obvious he that he would
not be advocating such a bill in the immediate future. Notwithstanding, the movement
did gain something of a victory through some of the Kennedy Administration's policies
during the early 1960s. Issued March 6, 1961, Kennedy's EO 10925 proved most
significant because it prohibited discrimination by employers holding federally funded
contracts and empowered government agencies to cancel contracts with unions and
businesses that violated "equal employment opportunities" provisions (Weiss, 1997, p.
55). Most significantly, EO 10925 was the first civil rights initiative to use the phrase
"affirmative action." In addition to prohibiting discrimination, EO 10925 stated that
"affirmative action [would be implemented] to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color
or national origin" (Skrentny, 1996, p. 7).
Despite the historical importance of EO 10925, the landmark 1964 Civil Rights
Act (CRA) paved the way for affilmative action, as it is understood in the twenty-first
century. President Johnson signed the CRA into law in a climate of intensifying national
racial tension. Title VI of the CRA was directed at enforcing the Brown decision and
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mandated desegregation of public elementary, secondary, and post-secondary institutions
and prohibited discrimination in education on the basis or race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Similarly, Title VII provided for equal employment opportunities by
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin (Bickel, 1998).
Notwithstanding, nothing in the 1964 CRA proscribed the development of
affirmative action programs. Certainly, the CRA was purportedly "color-blind"
legislation that was aimed specifically and singularly at non-discrimination, and
particularly at non-discrimination against blacks (Lee, 1999, pp. 393). Although the
agenda of many of the more radical black civil rights groups had already shifted away
from purely "color-blind" legislation towards more pro-active anti-discrimination
policies, the liberal supporters of the CRA who directed its passage emphasized its
stringent focus on non-discrimination. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minnesota)
made the following statement ShOlily before the Act was passed in 1964:
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title, there is nothing in it
that will give any power to the [Equal Employment 0ppOliunity] Commission or
to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a
racial 'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance. In fact, the very opposite is
true. Title VII prohibits discrimination. In effect, it says that race, religion, and
national origin are not to be used as the basis for hiring and firing. Title VII is
designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or
religion. (Lee, 1999, p. 393)
Despite Humphrey's pronouncements and the ostensibly "color-blind" purpose of the
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CRA, the civil rights movement had shifted away from non-discrimination and towards
anti-discrimination by the time of the legislation's passage. In a June 1965
commencement address at Howard College (a prestigious historically black college),
President Johnson seemingly signaled a shift in favor of affirmative action: "You do not
take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to
the standing line of race, and then say you are free to compete with all the others, and still
believe that you have been completely fair" (Weiss, 1997, p. 81).
Three months later, in September 1965, President Johnson issued EO 11246,
generally considered as the federal action that inaugurated affirmative action (Lee, 1999,
pp.393-407). Similar to Kennedy's EO 10925, EO 11246 reaffirmed the
nondiscrimination affirmative action requirements related to federal contractors.
Additionally, EO 11246 stipulated that contractors had to submit periodic "Compliance
Reports" and it established the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), a
division within the United States Department of Labor, to sup'ervise compliance with the
regulations. One of the first regulations that emerged from the OFCC required that
"goals" and "timetables" be set for the employment of minority group members (i.e.
Blacks, Spanish-surnamed Americans, American Indians, and Asians) in job categories
where they were currently "under-utilized" (Bacchi, 1996, pp. 32-33). Women were
assigned "minority status" under affirmative action mles in October of 1967 when
President Johnson issued EO 11375 (Weiss, 1997, p. 104).
The practice of affirmative action was rarely defined clearly in the first few years
of its operation. The mle making, administration, and enforcement that were divided
among several different federal agencies were chaotic and often contradictory. Initial
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confusion and debate arose over the use of the phrase "goals and timetables."
Nevertheless, a concern among employers, politicians, and affirmative action opponents
was that "goals and timetables" was just a clever way of identifying "quotas." The
United States Civil Service Commission (CSC) tried to dispel these fears with its
definition and clarification (issued in 1969) which seemingly opposed the use of quotas:
A 'goal' is a realistic objective which an agency endeavors to achieve on a timely
basis within the context of the merit system of employment. A 'quota' on the
other hand, would restrict employment or development opportunities to members
of particular groups by establishing a required number or proportionate
representation which agency managers are obliged to attain without regard to
merit system requirements. 'Quotas' are incompatible with merit principles. (Lee,
1999,p.397)
While the use of direct, fixed quotas thus seemed to be prohibited in employment-based
affirmative action, admissions officers in public universities Had already begun to put into
the place "minority quotas" for their annual undergraduate admissions by the late 1960s
and it would not be until 1978 that a clear decision concerning the use of quotas in
education would be made.
Judicial Interpretation of Affirmative Action Policies
In addition to a series of Executive Orders and the proliferation of agency
guidelines, affirmative action policy in the United States has primarily evolved through
the executive and judicial branches of government, rather than through the legislative
branch (i.e., Congress). A comprehensive review of the court cases that shaped the face
of affirmative action in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is perhaps beyond the scope of this
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thesis. Notwithstanding, a brief discussion of a few important Supreme Court decisions
is crucial in gaining an understanding of affirmative action policies.
Despite inconsistent and dissent-driven cases, the Supreme Court has played an
instrumental role in defining and interpreting specific affirmative action policies and
practices. The doctrine of disparate impact addresses the issues of when employment
practices are or are not permissible under EEO and affirmative action guidelines.
Disparate impact was first spelled out through the 1971 Supreme Court decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power [401 U.S. 424]. In Griggs, black employees at a power company's

station brought a class-action lawsuit against the company, asserting that it discriminated
against blacks by implementing a "test" policy. Specifically, this "test" policy consisted
of requiring a high school diploma or reasonable performance on two standardized test in
order for employees to qualify for a transfer from the coal-handling department. Prior to
the enactment of Title VII, Duke Power openly discriminated against black employees by
hiring them only to work in the coal handling facility; the "test" policy had been
implemented in the aftermath of Title VII, presumably as a way to keep blacks in the
coal-handling department and out of the management and administration ranks
(Dan sicker, 1991, p. 14).
Supreme Court Chief Justice WalTen Burger, who wrote the decision in the
Griggs case, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (workers). Burger opined, "[p]rocedures or

tests neutral on their face ... cannot be maintained if they operate to freeze the status quo
of prior discriminatory practices" (Dansicker, 1991, p. 14) . Justice Burger further
established the standard to be used in determining whether or not such a test was
permissible "[i]f an employment which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to
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be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited" (Dansicker, 1991, p. 15). The
Court concluded that the purpose of these requirements (i.e., high school gradation and
two aptitude tests) was to protect Duke's long-standing policy of providing job
preferences to its white employees.
In 1978, the major federal agencies involved in the EEO and affirmative action
practices issued the "Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures" which
aimed at providing a framework for the acceptable use of tests and other employment
procedures. The "Guidelines" established a formula for the "presumption of
discrimination" and adverse impact:
The Guidelines presume that discrimination exists whenever the percentage of
minorities in a company's work force is less than 80% of their share of the
surrounding population. A selection rate for any race, sex or ethnic group which
is less than four-fifth (80%) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will
generally be regarded by the federal government enforcement agencies as
evidence of adverse impact. (Lee, 1999, p. 400)
Few issues have generated as much controversy in the entire affirmative action debate as
the use of quotas and "set-asides" (which reserve "slots" for individuals in protected
categories). Public opinion surveys conducted in the 1960s through the 1990s
consistently demonstrated that the overwhelming majority (80%-90%) of Americans (of
all races and both genders) favored "equal opportunity legislation" (Steeh and Kraysan,
1996, p. 132). These surveys also indicated an overwhelming majority (80%-90%) of
white Americans (of both genders) opposed the use of quotas and deliberate programs of
racial preferences in employment settings (Zelnick, 1996, p. 351). Only a minority
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(25%-40%) of Americans (of all races) favored the use of quotas in college admissions
(Steeh and Krysan, 1996).
The Supreme Court has addressed the use of quotas and set-asides in a number of
cases. One of the primary cases to challenge the public sector use of affirmative action
policy came in the 1978 Supreme Court case, Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke [438 U.S. 265]. Allan Bakke, a thirty-seven-year-old white male engineer, had

twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis (CalDavis) and twice was rejected. As part of government mandated set-aside policy, CalDavis reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified"
minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program. Bakke's qualifications
(Medical College Admission Test score and grade point average) exceeded those of any
of the minority students admitted for the two years that Bakke was rejected.
Consequently, Bakke challenged the affirmative action policy of the medical school at
Cal-Davis on the basis of reverse discrimination (Machan, 1998). The looming issue for
the Supreme Court to decide was if Cal-Davis violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
"Equal Protection Clause" and Title VI of the 1964 CRA (which prohibits discrimination
based on race) by incorporating affirmative action policy into its admissions policy. The
Supreme Court mled in a 5-to-4 decision that Cal-Davis' quota system was
unconstitutional and Bakke was entitled to enrollment. The Supreme Court did find,
however, in a contrasting 5-to-4 decision, that it was constitutionally permissible for
universities to employ race as a criterion in admission policies (Stephens and Scheb,
2003). As Skrentny (1996) observed, "In a remarkable compromise, Bakke was to be
admitted, Davis had to move away from a fixed quota, but treating applicants with regard
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to race was acceptable" (p. 226).
Just a year later, the Court began to apply this "compromise view" towards the
use of quotas in occupational affirmative action programs. The 1979 case of United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber [443 U.S. 193] involved a contractor who had
implemented a racial quota for admission to a training program as part of an attempt to
increase the number of minorities. The Supreme Court ruled that such quota programs
were acceptable as long as "they mirrored the purpose of Title VII, did not trammel the
interest of white employees or create an absolute bar to advancement, and were used as a
temporary measure to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance" (Lee, 1999, p. 400).
Beginning in the late 1980s with the Supreme Court ruling in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio [490 U.S. 642] and throughout the early 1990s, the Supreme Court began to take
a less favorable view of affirmative action, consistently striking down the use of quotas
and other fixed preference schemes and increasingly supporting charges of reverse
discrimination against non-minority applicants. An exception\to the trend was the
passage of the 1991 CRA which:
[s]trengthened celiain remedies for intentional discrimination, modified the
burden of proof in adverse impact cases, and extended certain protection to
employees of the Congress ... one of the most significant revision was to change
Title VII from a merely remedial or 'make whole' statue to one that provides for
compensatory and punitive damages. (Lee, 1999, p. 401)
During the 1990s, a strong anti-affirmative action movement began to take root in
Texas, Washington, and California. In 1995, the Board of Regents of the University of
California made a decision to end racial preferences in admissions policies. The most

Affirmative Action 18
dramatic move against affirmative action in the 1990s occuned in Califomia. In
November of 1996, Califomia voters approved Proposition 209 by a margin of 54% to
46% (Weiss, 1997). The measure, which had attracted the SUppOlt of Califomia
Republicans and the National Republican Committee, prohibited the state from
discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to any individual or group based
on sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting (Chavez, 1998).
On June 23,2003, the Supreme Court delivered what are likely the most
important decisions to date dealing with affirmative action. Two class action lawsuits,

Gratz v. Bollinger [02-516] and Grutter v. Bollinger [02-241], were simultaneously
reviewed and decided on by the Supreme Court in relation to allegations of white
students being denied admission to the University of Michigan: s (Michigan)
undergraduate and law school programs. These two cases provided the Supreme Court
with its best opportunity to focus on the legality of the issue in the recent past. Prior to
the 2003 decisions, the undergraduate program at Michigan evaluated applicants on a
150-point scale. Whereas black, Hispanic, and Native-American applicants received
twenty points solely for their race, a perfect SAT score of 1600 rendered only twelve
points.
The Supreme Court ruled 6-to-3 in Gratz v. Bollinger [02-241] that Michigan's
race-conscious point system for undergraduate acceptance denied other applicants (nonminorities) equal protection under the law. Jennifer Gratz, who was denied admission to
Michigan's undergraduate program, had sued the school on the basis that Michigan's
implementation of race and ethnicity in admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the 1964 CRA. In addition to the
undergraduate decision, the Supreme Court reversed itself with the 5-to-4 Grutter v.

Bollinger [02-516] decision in favor of Michigan's law school admissions policy of using
race as a factor in admissions policy, providing race was not the only factor used.
Barbara Grutter, who was denied admission to the law school, sued Michigan on the
same grounds as Gratz. Unlike the undergraduate system, the Supreme Court reasoned
that using race as a determining factor in admissions provides "a meaningful
individualized review of applicants" (Will, 2003, A21). In his dissent of the law school
ruling, Justice Thomas (who was joined with Justice Scalia) quoted a message that
Frederick Douglass had delivered on January 26, 1865 in Boston, Massachusetts:
[I]n regard to the colored people, there is always more that is benevolent, I
perceive, than just, manifested towards us. What I ask for the Negro is not
benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice. The American people
have always been anxious to know what they shall do with us. I have had but one
answer from the beginning. Do nothing with us! Your doing with us has already
played the mischief with us. Do nothing with us! If the apples will not remain on
the tree of their own strength, if they are worm-eaten at the core, if they are early
ripe and disposed to fall, let them fall! And if the Negro cannot stand on his own
legs, let him fall also. All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs!
Let him alone! Your interference is doing him positive injury. (Thomas, 2003,
para. 122)
Justice Thomas continued in his dissent:
Like Douglas, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life

Affirmative Action 20
without the meddling of university administrators. Because I wish to see all
students succeed whatever their color, I share, in some retrospect, the sympathies
of those who sponsor the type of discrimination advanced by the University of
Michigan Law School (Law School). The Constitution does not, however tolerate
institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions policies when such devotion
ripens into racial discrimination. Nor does the Constitution countenance the
unprecedented deference the Court gives to the Law School, an approach
inconsistent with the very concept of "strict scrutiny." Racial discrimination is
not a permissible solution to the self-inflicted wounds of this elitist admissions
policy. (Thomas, 2003, para. 123)
The Supreme Court's split decision of the Michigan cases had the effect of amending the
Constitution. The newly created legal precedent of "the compelling interest of diversity"
has superseded the Fourteenth Amendment's "Equal Protection Clause." According to
Rush Limbaugh, a nationally syndicated radio talk-show host, "University of Michigan's
law school can now say that people of certain colors can be discriminated against. They
can now say to certain students, 'You're too genetically and mentally inferior to compete
on a level playing field, so we're going to give you special preferences.' It's a massive
insult" (2003, par. 1). The contradictory rulings of the Supreme Court in these two cases
did not completely resolve whether diversity is a governmental interest that can guide
publicly funded schools' admissions. The Supreme Court reasoned that the
undergraduate system resembled too much of a racial quota system, and was therefore
unconstitutional. Conversely, the Supreme Court upheld the law school's use of race in
admissions because it employed the term "critical mass" as opposed to "quota."
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Notwithstanding, it remains unclear why the Supreme Court handed down two
conflicting decisions without providing a clear rationale, but essentially, these decisions
have entrenched a racist system of legal preferences. The serendipitous decisions have
promoted the need for racial diversity at the expense of violating and ultimately
suspending the constitutional rights of individuals. The Supreme Court has manufactured
a way for racial preferences to exist. According to Justice Scalia, the rulings are a "split
doubleheader [that] seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the
litigation" (Maddox, 2003, para. 13).
Affirmative Action in Higher Education
With the exception of the recent Michigan cases, the seminal affirmative action
case in higher education was the Bakke decision. In his separate decision, Justice Powell
made the case for the value of diversity in education, while simultaneously striking down
the use of fixed quotas. Bickel (1998) argues that another Justice in the case, Justice
Blackmun, took the bold step of challenging the "Court to recognize the moral argument
for affirmative action" (p. 10). Furthermore, Justice Blackmun opined: "[I]n order to get
beyond racism we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to
treat some person equally, we must first treat them differently" (Bickel, 1998, p. 10).
Despite sharing many of the same features, the affirmative action debate in the
context of education is fundamentally different from the context in employment.
Whereas employers are not expected to consider the "moral argument" for affirmative
action, institutions of higher education are expected to consider such an argument. As
Justice Powell (Bakke decision) suggested, diversity is regarded as extremely valuable in
institutions of higher learning. Most public universities and a majority of private
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universities made a commitment to diversity in their admission policies shortly after the
passage of the 1964 CRA. While formal quota systems were theoretically abandoned in
the wake of the Bakke decision, the majority of universities continued to implement some
type of racial-preferential treatment throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. According
to a statement made by a Stanford University admissions officer in 1995, "[t]he
characteristic of race and ethnicity have become paramount" in the selection of
prospective students (Bunzel, 1996, p. 53). Universities not only have a vested interest in
ensuring the ethnic diversity of their student body, they are also often swayed by the
argument that they have a moral obligation to ensure that the marketplace of education be
inclusive of all ideas which by implication means that it must be inclusive of all people.
Affirmative action in higher education is perhaps even more controversial than
affirmative action in employment. The central argument against affirmative action in
education is that attaining diversity requires an assault on merit (Steele, 1999). Racepreferential admissions most likely means that candidates with better academic
credentials (e.g., test scores) will be "passed over" in favor of those candidates with
lesser qualifications but who have "membership" in the target protected group. Evidence
has shown a persistent pattern of significantly lower scores for African Americans and
Hispanics (as compared to Caucasians) and even slightly higher scores for Asian
Americans over Caucasians. In his article entitled "Race and College Admissions," John
Bunzel (1996) cites the 1988 figures from the University of California-Berkeley that
revealed the mean SAT scores for Berkeley freshmen: Asian 1269, Caucasian 1267,
Latino 1053, and African American 979. Bunzel observes, "they [the scores] do not
suggest that students of all racial or ethnic groups are held to the same standard" (p. 54).
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Critics of ending race-preference admissions in higher education suggest that it
would dramatically reverse the "gains" of the past three decades. According to Bunzel
(1996), "if admissions were race-neutral, the best estimate is that perhaps only one-third
of the minority students (excluding Asian Americans) would still get it" (p. 54). From
the perspective of affirmative action opponents, this would be an impartial outcome and
consistent with academia's purported focus on merit. Even affirmative action opponents
such as Harvard University professor Nathan Glazer (1999) acknowledge that college
admissions have never been run as a pure meritocracy:
Even before the age of racial preferences, it [admissions policies at the most
selective universities] took into account not only academic qualifications but also
such factors as leadership qualities, ability to contribute to athletic teams, alumni
connections, and special talents. The children of persons of distinction, and in
state universities perhaps legislators' children, might receive preference.
'Diversity' considerations also existed, but up until probably the 1950s, this was
mostly a matter of keeping down the number of Jews. (p. 52)
Despite the gender-focused character of recent revisions of the CRA (e.g. the sexual
harassment provisions of the 1991 CRA), gender is rarely viewed as anything but an
afterthought in the affirmative action debate. Skrentny (1996) contends that his book
gives no consideration to women and various racial or ethnic groups beyond AfricanAmericans:
Though much of the law applies equally to women, the arguments in the scholarly
articles and mass media almost always center on (black) racial preferences, not on
gender preferences. More important, women, other groups, and affirmative action
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are not explored here because, as we will see, affirmative action developed as a
model of justice for African-Americans, in response to a stmggle for racial
equality and a racial cl1sis. (p. 15)
In her book, The Politics of Affirmative Action: 'Women,' Equality and Category Politics,
Carol Bacchi (1996) suggested the following after observing affirmative action programs
and their impact on women in the United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway,
Canada, and Australia:
A quick pemsal of the major theoretical analyses of affirmative action in the
United States illustrates how often 'women' is relegated to a footnote. The
common explanation is that the arguments concerning affirmative action are most
clearly developed using the example of race and that gender raises somewhat
different, less 'pressing' issues. (p. 42)
Not only is the history of affirmative action inherently a black history, but it also
draws from a female historical point of view. Despite the faCt that the "equal pay for
equal work" campaign had already been launched, few people gave any serious
consideration to sex discrimination at the time (Bacchi, 1996, p. 41). The passage of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, (29 U.S.C. Section 206), which required equal pay for men and
women engaged in comparable work, may have been presumed by many analysts to have
"taken care of' working women's more immediate needs (Sass and Troyer, 1999, p. 571).
Lee notes that it was little more than a bad joke that women were even included in the
original non-discrimination provisions of the 1964 CRA. Lee (1999) explains the fact
that the original language of the CRA did not include any reference whatsoever to gender
was in all likelihood inadvertently inserted by one its most ardent foes-Representative
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Howard W. Smith (D-Virginia):
When he [Howard W. Smith] realized the tide was turning against him, he offered
an amendment to add 'sex' as a prohibited form of discrimination. He may have
intended this as a 'poison pill,' and he later said it was ajoke, but to his dismay,
the amendment passed. Thus, women became a protected group, covered by the
same provisions in housing, education, and employment as 'disadvantaged
minorities.' (p.401)
Although the category of "women" was, by the mid-1970s, completely "folded
into" the affirmative action guidelines and regulations, analysts (both inside and outside
of government) continued to express doubts about the inclusion of women as a
"minority." James Scanlon (1992), a former assistant general counsel with the EEOC,
said the following:
Few would deny that but for the history of slavery and legally enforced
segregation that followed, affirmative action would never have become a feature
of American life. Yet, over the near quarter-century in which the controversy
over preferential policies has raged in and out of the courts, one of the most
neglected issues has been the wisdom or propriety of extending such preferences
beyond the 12 percent of the population that is descended from slaves-not only to
another tenth or so of the population that is descended from slaves-not only to
another tenth or so of the population considered to be also disadvantaged
minorities, but to women, just over one-half of the population. (p. 36)
Notwithstanding the opposition of Scanlan and others, there is evidence to indicate that
women "qualify" as an economically oppressed group. In their article, "Diversity
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Management: A New Organizational Paradigm," Gilbert, Stead, and Ivancevich (1999)
cite a broad range of empirical studies and surveys that document the persistent malefemale "wage gap"; the under-representation of women in management positions and
high-paying professional positions; and the concentration of women in low-paying
occupations (p. 63).
The Arguments in Favor of and Against Affirmative Action
Before analyzing the arguments on both sides of the affirmative action debate, it
would be remiss not to differentiate at the onset between two forms of affirmative action
as identified by Louis J. Pojman (1998) in his essay "The Case Against Affirmative
Action." The first form, "weak affirmative action," seeks to promote equal opportunity
by employing race as a tie-breaker between two equally qualified applicants for
employment, college admissions, or some other position in society. The goal for "weak
affirmative action" is equal opportunity to compete, not equal results. The second form,
"strong affirmative action," applies preferential treatment

sol1~ly

based on race, while

ignoring the possibility that the applicant might indeed be less qualified than a nonminority applicant (Pojman, 1998). Opponents contend that strong affirmative action is
tantamount to reverse discrimination of individuals of non-minority status. Racism in the
context of reverse discrimination is comparable to conventional racism. This policy is
the form of affirmative action cUlTently being advanced under the name "affilmative
action."
In spite of obstacles and despite its disadvantages, proponents of affirmative

action insist that it must be defended because they assert racism and discrimination are
still commonplace in education and employment. Proponents also insist that equality is
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not achievable unless preferential treatment is applied to those that have endured
discrimination and unwelcomed disadvantages (McKenna and Feingold, 1978).
Affirmative action is justified to counter past discrimination (both privately and publicly)
against minorities and women in society.
The first argument in defense of affirmative action policy in the workplace and in
education is the critical need for role models. Successful minority people will encourage
and motivate other people of minority status to be confident in knowing that excellence
can be achieved. Moreover, role models will strongly influence younger people to strive
for excellence that others "of our kind" have already achieved.
The argument from compensation insists that victims of past discrimination are
entitled to preferential treatment as reparation for the harms that have been previously
committed against them. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. (1996), profe,ssor at Harvard Law
School, claims, "It [affirmative action] is a small but significant way to compensate
victims of slavery, Jim Crow laws, discrimination and immigration restrictions" (para. 2).
By implication, this argument is based on the "two wrongs make a right" assumption
acknowledging that since some whites once enslaved some blacks, the descendants of
those slaves are entitled to opportunities, qualification, and compensation for past
grievances. Proponents are quick to defend the compensation argument by pointing out
that blacks have not just been the victims of unfair treatment, but more importantly
"subjected first to decades of slavery, and then to decades of second-class citizenship,
widespread legalized discrimination, economic persecution, educational deprivation, and
cultural stigmatization. They have been bought, sold, killed, beaten, raped, excluded,
exploited, shamed, and scorned for a very long time" (Fish, 1993, para. 5). Furthelmore,

Affirmative Action 28
historian Roger Wilkins has noted that of the 375 years that blacks have inhabited the
United States, 245 years entailed slavery; legalized segregation constituted 100 years, and
only for about thirty years have blacks enjoyed first class citizenry (PIous, 1996).
Implementing preferential treatment is a method that can compensate for past and
ongoing injustices against women and other minorities. Notwithstanding, the
compensation argument is vulnerable because compensation is only limited to race and
gender. Hypothetically, a male or female, born poor and white, could be extremely
disadvantaged, yet under affirmative action would not collect any benefits. Bernard
Goldberg (2003), author of Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the
News remarks:
I'm against affirmative action when it means racial preferences, which in the real
world is what affirmative action is usually about. Why should the children Jesse
Jackson or Colin Powell or Diana Ross get some kind of racial preference when
they apply to college or go out for ajob, but no 'affirmative action' is given to the
child of a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant coal miner from West Virginia? (pp. 5657)
When society proposes to level the playing field for minorities and women, innocent
white males, according to affirmative action supporters, are not wan"anted in complaint or
protest because they have benefited from the unjust discrimination of blacks, other
minorities, and women. Therefore, it is permissible to award benefits to a less qualified
woman or minority person. In her essay, "Preferential Hiring," Judith Jarvis Thomson
(1995) supports reverse discrimination by suggesting that preferential treatment "is
something the community takes away from [white males] in order that it may make
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amends" (p. 60). Thus, supporters of affirmative action advocate the elimination of
discriminatory laws that favor white males at the expense of minorities and women
(McKenna and Feingold, 1978).
Those individuals in favor of implementing affirmative action also indicate the
inequality of results as compelling evidence for an inequality of opportunity (equal
results argument). In his essay, "The Justice of Affirmative Action," Sterling Harwood
(1993) further develops this argument as he writes, "When will affirmative action stop
compensating blacks? As soon as the unfair advantage is gone, affirmative action will
stop. The elimination of the unfair advantage can be determined by showing that the
percentage of blacks hired and admitted at least roughly equaled the percentage of blacks
in the population" (p. 82). The objective of implementing affilmative action is "an
attempt at redistlibution, an attempt to achieve a limited but nycessary reallocation of
jobs and income within the existing legal structure. It is part of a long-term civil rights
strategy to mal(e the law operate as an instrument of social clIange" (McKenna and
Feingold, 1978, p. 202).
The leading argument in support of affirmative action policy within society is the
need for diversity. Those in support of attaining diversity maintain the importance of
every person coming to appreciate other's culture and outlook on life. Diversity, whether
in the scope of the workplace or in education, better enables an individual to examine his
or her principles and beliefs vis-a.-vis other cultures. Barbara Bergmann (1996), author of

In Defense of Affirmative Action, asserts, "[t]he major justification for affirmative action
in the workplace is its use as a systematic method of breaking down the current
discrimination against blacks and women. The desirability of diversity provides the
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strongest justification for affirmative action in college admissions" (p. 118). Diversity is
purportedly just another facet of a well-rounded education. A campus environment
immersed in the diversity of people, ideas, and arguments fulfills one of the essential
goals of education by developing the mind and the intellect.
Those individuals opposed to affirmative action policy in the workplace and in
education claim discrimination is being proposed as the solution to resolving the effects
of past discrimination. While seeking to help disadvantaged minorities and women,
reverse discrimination has generally been consigned toward white males. Affirmative
action was "Originally conceived as a means to redress discrimination, [and] racial
preferences have [now] promoted it. And rather than fostering harmony and integration,
preferences have divided the campus. In no other area of public life is there a greater
disparity between the rhetoric of preferences and the reality" (Sacks and Thiel, 1996,
para. 2). A significant argument directed against affirmative action is that it imparts
discrimination on those individuals not covered under its precepts. Specifically,
discrimination directed at innocent white people only creates another form of
discrimination. In his essay, "What is Wrong with Reverse Discrimination," Edwin C.
Hettinger (1997) comments, "Reverse discrimination against white males is the same evil
as traditional discrimination against women and blacks. The only difference is that in
this case it is the white male that is being discriminated against. Thus if additional racism
and sexism is wrong, so is reverse discrimination, and for the very same reasons" (pp.
305-306). Affirmative action then becomes discrimination-sanctioned law, and under the
guises of quotas and statistics, reverse discrimination has plagued the productivity of
businesses. Lisa Newton, in her essay "Reverse Discrimination is Unjustified," contends
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that if the point of reverse discrimination is to ensure equality for minorities, then which
minority does one favor (Olen and BalTY, 2001)? Newton further asserts that even if it is
agreed upon that women and minorities are entitled to special treatment to undo the
effects of past discrimination, the future practice of affilmative action will still remain
unknown (Olen and Barry, 2001).
Another argument in opposition to affirmative action policy is a revision of the
compensation argument proposed by supporters. Those individuals opposed to
affirmative action recognize only that individual victims al·e eligible for reparations, not
the entire class of individuals previously discriminated against. Economist Thomas
Sowell (who happens to be black) remarked, "[t]hose initially in dire poverty have, over
the generations, raised themselves to an above-average level of prosperity, by great effort
and painful sacrifice. Now the deep thinkers come along and ~ant to redistribute what
they earn to others who were initially more fortunate but less hard working" (McElroy,
2001, p. 33). Members of a historically discriminated group are in effect not necessarily
victims; consequently, compensation is not necessal·ily owed. A compensatory justice
should not apply to the distant descendants of previously discriminated-against groups.
Furthermore, white men as a class and taxpayers al·e the very ones made to directly and
indirectly pay for the compensation, yet they al·e not the ones who committed the
injustices. Opponents of affirmative action contend that no one should pay for the
reparations because the perpetrators, like the victims, are dead. Glazer, in his essay,
"Compensation for the Past is a Dangerous Principle," articulates this argument,
"Compensation for the past is a dangerous principle. It can be extended indefinitely and
make for endless trouble. Who is to determine what is proper compensation for the
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American Indian, the black, the Mexican American, the Chinese or Japanese American?"
(McKenna and Feingold, 1978, p. 205). In their book, "America in Black and White,"
Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom (1997) have suggested that "affirmative action retards
the progress of blacks: [... ] the growth of the black middle class long predates the
adoption of race-conscious social policies. In some ways, indeed, the black middle class
was expanding more rapidly before 1970 than after. [... ] Many of the advances black
Americans have made since the Great Depression occurred before anything that can be
termed 'affirmative action' existed [... ] In the years since affirmative action, [the black
middle class] has continued to grow, but not at a more rapid pace than in the preceding
three decades, despite a common impression to the contrary" (Elder, 2003, para. 13).
According to the challengers of affirmative action policy, employing preferential
treatment generates inefficiency as well as an undermining of plack self-esteem. First,
affirmative action policy results in loss of profits, decreased productivity, and reduced
quality in the workplace. Those individuals who have advanced due to affirmative action
will have contributed to overall inefficiency because they were the less qualified and less
productive applicants who obtained the positions. According to author Tibor R. Machan
(1988), the only norm for the economist is "economic efficiency-producing and
distributing what is in demand at the lowest possible cost. The expanded idea of market
failure accepts that what is demanded should be produced efficiently" (p. 165). In
addition to producing inefficiency, affirmative action affects self-esteem. Racial
preferences serve as a discouragement to minorities because they are labeled as inferior.
In her essay, "Affirmative Action: The Price of Preference," Shelby Steel (1997)
comments, "It [affirmative action] indirectly encourages blacks to exploit their own past
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victimization as a source of power and privilege. Victimization is what justifies
preference, so that to receive the benefits of preferential treatment one must become
invested in the view of one's self as a victim" (p. 319). It does not seem too hard to
imagine an employer quickly promoting women and minorities in an effort to fulfill
quota standards. Surely when these individuals fail, their failure will be viewed as
confirmation of their inadequacy. Then again, when some of these people do succeed on
their own merit, it will be assumed they were the recipients of special treatment. Thus,
undermining a person's self-esteem can understandably foster resentment.
The most effective safeguard against discrimination is the very device which
affirmative action seeks to destroy. A free market system unconstrained by governmental
control provides one of the best limits against discrimination because profits and losses
are the ultimate determining factors. Discrimination costs mopey because it alienates
customers by forcing away their potential business. The free-market system is blind
toward color and women and it is for this very reason that it can be an effective detenent
toward discrimination. Affirmative action policies are allowing blacks and women whom
have advanced on their own merit to be unfairly stigmatized. Consequently,
accomplishments are going unnoticed in the marketplace.
The 2003 Supreme Court rulings in the two Michigan cases further entrenched a
racist system of legal preferences and as a result have diverted the issue of racism from
people of minority status and consigned it toward whites and Asians. Nonetheless, the
United States Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1964 CRA,
forbids extending an advantage to one group over another solely based on race or color.
The Constitutional concept of equality of rights wan-ants that all people are created equal
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and have a right to equal treatment under the law, regardless of their gender, race, or
national origin. The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution states that no state may
"deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." Thus, an
individual of non-minority status should expect equal treatment when applying for a job
or applying for college admission. Yet on June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court in effect
changed the Constitution and subsequently failed America and the principles that this
nation was founded upon-that Americans are created equal and that they are entitled to
the equal protection under the law.
Employing affirmative action policies in higher education has stigmatized
minorities as second-rate. Imagine the insult if a black female were told that because of
her "supposed inferiorities" (i.e., low test scores), she was going to be granted a special
preference. Consequently, the principle of achieving excellence within higher education
has been dealt a severe setback. Instead of implementing race-based admission policies,
colleges and universities should utilize race-neutral means of attaining minority students
instead of resorting to preferences and reverse discrimination. For example, Florida,
Texas, and California have implemented a system in which a percentage of top
performers at all public high schools, even those high schools that are mainly comprised
of minority students, are assured admission into more prestigious state colleges and
universities.
Affirmative action is replete with contradictions because it attempts to attain
equality through inequality by practicing reverse discrimination on people of nonminority status. The practice of implementing affirmative action policy might well
become a cure worse than the disease. Targeting supposedly historically disadvantaged
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groups (i.e., women and minorities) will undoubtedly further intensify divisions and
delay hope of a more classless society. What does affirmative action really affirm?
Based on the flawed assertions coupled with the devastating economic and social costs,
affirmative action proves to be little more than an agenda for political correctness.
Affirmative action policies are untenable and an initiative that proves to be imprudent.
The irony of the June 2003 Supreme Court decisions is that they came on the 40 th
anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.' s "I Have a Dream" speech where he ardently
proclaimed that his children were to "live in a nation where they will not be judged by the
color of their skin but by the content of their character" (para. 15). Today's college
applicants will have to hope that by the time their children are of college age, their skin
color will not be used against them. Like King before me, I share in that dream too.
Using affirmative action to eliminate racism

establish~s

a system of irreversible

stereotypes. Making a decision on skin color is simply racial discrimination. Diversity
of skin color is not tantamount to a diversity of viewpoint. People are all different-a
black person is not automatically a democrat and vice-versa. Similarly, there is no
Hispanic ideal. Assuming a linkage between diversity of skin color with a diversity of
viewpoint destroys the fabric of society by erroneously assuming a linkage between
culture and experience of the minority group. In his essay, "Affirmative Action and the
American Creed," Martin Seymour Lipset (1995) quotes Washington Post political
columnist William Raspberry (who happens to be black): "White Americans do not see
themselves as racists, nor as opponents of equal 0ppOliunity and fundamental fairness.
What they oppose are efforts to provide preferential benefits for minorities. How could
we expect them to buy a product we [blacks] have spent four-hundred years trying to
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have recalled: race-based advantages enshrined into law" (p. 154). Affirmative action
propagates what it sets out to deny. Higher education is not out to attain diversity; but
rather colleges and universities are out for the number game, which furthers racism.
Affirmative action promotes an enoneous view of group rights at the expense and
exclusion of individual rights. American society has mistakenly looked at the
"problems" of certain groups of people being historically disadvantaged, in addition to
sexism and racism, and adopted an enoneous course of action. Affirmative action, though
having seemingly better intentions earlier in its history, has outlived its purpose. Thus,
affirmative action policies that are prevalent in the twenty-first century promote
significant negative consequences with minimal benefits.
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